Chapter 1: How can the global be local? Islam, the West and the globalisation of identity politics by Hylland Eriksen, Thomas - Autor/a
In an important sense, the present human world is more tightly integrated than
at any earlier point in history. In the age of the jet plane and satellite dish, the age
of global capitalism, the age of ubiquitous markets and global mass media, various
commentators have claimed that the world is rapidly becoming a single place.
Although this slightly exaggerated description has an important point to make, an
even more striking development of the post-cold war world is the emergence
–seemingly everywhere– of identity politics whose explicit aim is the restoration of
rooted tradition, religious fervour and/or commitment to ethnic or national identi-
ties, majoritarian and minoritarian. As I write from my home in Oslo, Norway has
just celebrated its Constitution Day (17 May), and never before has there been as
many folk costumes in town as this year. More than 90% of the population cele-
brate 17 May, and more than half of the women wear folk dresses (bunader). The
number of men, although much lower, is also on the rise. In my childhood, three
decades ago, which unfolded in a less intensely globalised world, folk dresses were
rarely seen in the urban centres of south-eastern Norway. Now, consider the fact
that only a few months earlier, Norwegians had, like other West Europeans, been
debating the question of whether or not to legislate against the use of headscarves
(hijabs) among Muslim immigrant women. Again, a couple of decades ago, hijabs
were hardly ever seen among Muslim immigrant women in Europe. Even today,
many young Muslim women wear the hijab against their father’s wish.
In all likelihood, few of the very many women (and men) sporting neo-
traditionalist garb on Constitution Day would have reflected on the parallel
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between the rise of visible identity markers among minorities and in the majority.
And one would have to be a social scientist interested in globalisation to see these
markers of difference not as a “natural” expression of a “natural” identity, nor as a
simple reaction against globalisation, but as one of its most common forms. If any-
thing, globalisation at the level of social identity is tantamount to a re-negotiation
of social identities, their boundaries and symbolic content. Nobody is quite certain
as to what it means to be a Berliner, a Malaysian or a Norwegian any more, but this
does not necessarily mean that these identities are going away. Some of them are in
fact strengthened, with new or old symbolic content; some wane to the benefit of
others; some are enlarged or shrunk as to social compass. Just as a fish is totally
uninterested in water as long as it swims happily around –it is even unlikely to be
aware of the existence of water– most people don’t think twice about those of their
identities that can be taken for granted. But the moment you drag the poor crea-
ture out of the sea, be it on a hook or in a net, it immediately develops an intense
interest in water; what the water means to it, how it is essential for its survival, and
–not least– the peculiar nature of water. Had fish been equipped with an ability to
ponder, a great number of short-lived (and doubtless post-structuralist) theories
about water would have been sketched in haste, in maritime surroundings, every
day. In the case of humans, not only are the national, regional and local identities
contested and challenged, but it is becoming increasingly difficult to defend abso-
lutist views of gender and kinship identities as well. Place, that is to say a fixed, sta-
ble, meaningful space, is becoming a scarce and flexible resource. Maintaining a
predictable and secure group identity is hard work these days.
Globalisation as annihilation of distance
It cannot be contested that globalisation in all its forms –political, cultural, eco-
nomic, military…– is a pervasive tendency influencing the lives of people every-
where –from the Amazon rainforest to Japanese cities. The concept has recently
become a fashionable one in social and cultural studies, and as a result, its mean-
ing has become fuzzy. I would propose, therefore, a view of globalisation as all
the sociocultural processes that contribute to making distance irrelevant. It has
important economic, political and cultural dimensions, as well as equally impor-
tant ethical implications. Truly global processes affect the conditions of people liv-
ing in particular localities, creating new opportunities and new forms of vulnera-
bility. Risks are globally shared in the era of the nuclear bomb, transnational ter-
rorism and potential ecological disasters. On the same note, the economic condi-
tions in particular localities frequently (some would say always) depend on events
taking place elsewhere in the global system. If there is an industrial boom in
Taiwan, towns in the English Midlands will be affected. If oil prices rise, that
means salvation for the oil-exporting Trinidadian economy and disaster for the oil-
importing, neighbouring Barbadian one.
Patterns of consumption also seem to merge in certain respects; peo-
ple nearly everywhere desire similar goods, from cellphones to readymade gar-
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ments. Now, a precondition for this to happen is the more or less successful
implementation of certain institutional dimensions of modernity, notably that of a
monetary economy –if not necessarily evenly distributed wagework and literacy.
The ever-increasing transnational flow of commodities, be they material or imma-
terial, creates a set of common cultural denominators which appear to eradicate
local distinctions. The hot-dog (halal or not, as the case may be), the pizza and
the hamburger (or, in India, the lamburger) are truly parts of world cuisine; iden-
tical pop songs are played in identical discotheques in Costa Rica and Thailand;
the same Coca-Cola commercials are shown with minimal local variations at cin-
emas all over the world, Harry Potter volumes are ubiquitous wherever books are
sold, and so on. Investment capital, military power and world literature are being
disembedded from the constraints of space; they no longer belong to a particular
locality. With the development of the jet plane, the satellite dish and more recent-
ly, the Internet, distance no longer seems a limiting factor for the flow of influ-
ence, investments and cultural meaning. 
Globalisation is, in other words, not merely another word for the
growing transnational economy. It is true that it is largely driven by technology
and economic interests, but it must be kept in mind that it encompasses a wide
range of regular events that are not in themselves technological or economic.
Take the human rights discourse, for example: in the course of the second half of
the twentieth century, the ideas and values associated with human rights have
spread from educated elites worldwide (and not just in the West) to villagers and
farmers in areas which until recently seemed both remote and exotic to the
Western eye. The rapid dissemination of human rights ideas is, in fact, probably
one of the most spectacular successes of globalisation.
Identity politics as globalisation
At the same time, we have in recent years witnessed the growth, in very many
societies in all continents, of political movements seeking to strengthen the col-
lective sense of uniqueness, often targeting globalisation processes, which are
seen as a threat to local distinctiveness and self-determination. A European exam-
ple with tragic consequences is the rise of ethnic nationalism in Croatia and
Serbia from the 1980s, but even in the more prosperous and stable European
Union strong ethnic and nationalist movements grew during the 1990s, ranging
from Scottish separatism to the anti-immigration Front National in France and
nationalist populism in countries like Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands. In
Asia, two of the most powerful examples from recent history were the rise of the
Taliban to power in Afghanistan and the meteoric success of the Hindu national-
ist BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party, “Party of the Indian People”) in India; and many
African countries have also seen a strong ethnification of their politics during the
last decade-and-a-half, as well as the rise of political Islam in the Sahel and the
north. In the Americas, various minority movements, from indigenous groups to
African Americans, have with increasing success demanded cultural recognition
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and equal rights. In sum, politics around the turn of the millennium has to a great
extent meant identity politics. 
This new political scene, difficult to fit into the old left–right divide, is
interpreted in very different ways by the many academics and journalists who have
studied them. This is partly because identity politics comes in many flavours: some
are separatist nationalist movements; some represent historically oppressed
minorities which demand equal rights; some are dominant groups trying to pre-
vent minorities from gaining access to national resources; some are religious, some
are ethnic, and some are regional. Many writers see identity politics in general as
an anti-modern counterreaction to the individualism and freedom embodied by
globalisation, while others see it as the defence of the weak against foreign domi-
nance, or even as a concealed strategy of modernisation. Some emphasize the
psychological dimension of identity politics, seeing it as nostalgic attempts to
retain dignity and a sense of rootedness in an era of rapid change; others focus on
competition for scarce resources between groups; some see identity politics as a
strategy of exclusion and an ideology of hatred, while yet others see it as the true-
born child of socialism, as an expression of the collective strivings of the underdog. 
Neither of these interpretations and judgments tells the whole story,
both because the concrete movements in question differ and because the phe-
nomenon of identity politics is too complex for a simple explanation to suffice.
What is clear, however, is that the centripetal or unifying forces of globalisation
and the centrifugal or fragmenting forces of identity politics are two sides of the
same coin, two complementary tendencies which must be understood well for
anyone wishing to make sense of the global scene at the turn of the millennium. 
For a variety of reasons, globalisation creates the conditions for locali-
sation, that is various kinds of attempts at creating bounded entities –countries
(nationalism or separatism), faith systems (religious revitalisation), cultures (lin-
guistic or cultural movements) or interest groups (ethnicity). For this reason, a
more apt term, coined by Roland Robertson (1992), could be glocalisation. Let
me now move to a general description of some features that the “glocal” identi-
ty movements of the turn of the millennium seem to have in common –the rudi-
ments of a grammar of identity politics1.
First, identity politics always entails competition over scarce resources.
Successful mobilisation on the basis of collective identities presupposes a wide-
spread belief that resources are unequally distributed along group lines.
“Resources” should be interpreted in the widest sense possible, and could in princi-
ple be taken to mean economic wealth or political power, recognition or symbolic
power. What is at stake can be economic or political resources, but the recognition
of others has been an underestimated, scarce resource, as well as meaningful social
attachments where one is in command of one’s own life to an acceptable degree.
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Secondly, modernisation and globalisation actualize differences and
trigger conflict. When formerly discrete groups are integrated into shared eco-
nomic and political systems, inequalities are made visible, since direct comparison
between the groups becomes possible. Friction occurs frequently. In a certain
sense, ethnicity can be described as the process of making cultural differences
comparable, and to that extent, it is a modern phenomenon boosted by the
intensified contact entailed by globalisation. You do not envy your neighbour if
you are unaware of his existence.
Thirdly, similarity overrules equality ideologically. Ethnic nationalism,
politicized religion and indigenous movements all depict the in-group as homoge-
neous, as people “of the same kind”. Internal differences are glossed over, and
for this reason, it can often be argued that identity politics serves the interests of
the privileged segments of the group, even if the group as a whole is underprivi-
leged, since it conceals internal class differences.
Fourthly, images of past suffering and injustice are invoked. To men-
tion a few examples: in the 1990s, Serbs bemoaned the defeat at the hands of
the Turks in Kosovo in 1389; leaders of the Hindu BJP have taken great pains to
depict Mughal (Muslim) rule in India from the 1500s as bloody and authoritarian;
and the African American movement draws extensively on the history of slavery.
Even spokesmen for clearly privileged groups, such as anti-immigrant politicians
in Western Europe, may argue along these lines.
Fifthly, the political symbolism and rhetoric evokes personal experi-
ences. This is perhaps the most important ideological feature of identity poli-
tics in general. Using myths, cultural symbols and kinship terminology in
addressing their supporters, promoters of identity politics try to downplay the
difference between personal experiences and group history. In this way, it
becomes perfectly sensible for a Serb to talk about the legendary battle of
Kosovo in the first person (“We lost in 1389”), and the logic of revenge is
extended to include metaphorical kin, in many cases millions of people. The
intimate experiences associated with locality and family are thereby projected
onto a national screen. 
Sixthly, first-comers are contrasted with invaders. Although this ideo-
logical feature is by no means universal in identity politics, it tends to be invoked
whenever possible, and in the process, historical facts are frequently stretched. 
Finally, the actual social complexity in society is reduced to a set of sim-
ple contrasts. As Adolf Hitler already wrote in Mein Kampf, the truly national
leader concentrates the attention of his people on one enemy at the time. Since
cross-cutting ties reduce the chances of violent conflict, the collective identity
must be based on relatively unambiguous criteria (such as place, religion, mother-
tongue, kinship). Again, internal differences are undercommunicated in the act of
delineating boundaries towards the frequently demonized Other.
Identity politics is a true-born child of globalisation. The more similar
we become, the more different we try to be. Paradoxically, however, the more dif-
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ferent we try to be, the more similar we become –since most of us try to be dif-
ferent in roughly the same ways worldwide, as I have suggested.
Against the view that identity politics is somehow anachronistic, it has
been argued many times, always correctly, that although it tends to be dressed in
traditional garb, beneath the surface it is a product of modernity and its associat-
ed dilemmas of identity. The strong emotions associated with a tradition, a cul-
ture or a religion can never be mobilized unless people feel that it is under siege.
We are, in this sense, like fish. 
Viewed in this way, the collective emotions that identity politics
depend on reveal themselves to be deeply modern emotions associated with the
sense of loss experienced in situations of rapid change. The need for security,
belonging and enduring social ties based on trust is universal and cannot be
wished away. Ethnic nationalism, minority movements and politicized religion
offer a larger share of the cake as well as a positive sense of self, and like it or not,
these movements will remain influential in most parts of the world until some-
thing better comes along. 
The case of “the West” and “Islam”
The single most discussed field of tension involving identity politics is doubtless
the relationship between “the West” and “Islam”. Since the Salman Rushdie
affair from 1988, but especially after 11 September 2001, this presumed opposi-
tion has been subject to an enormous amount of attention, both among secu-
larised North Atlantic peoples, Muslims and everybody else. Drawing on the pre-
supposition that identity politics, which is often antagonistic in nature, is a main
form of globalisation, I now proceed to analysing some aspects of this assumed
conflict as a trueborn child of globalisation. But first, a short detour. 
The perhaps most influential organic intellectuals of the current
regime in Washington are Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington. Both are
authors of widely distributed books about the “new world order”, and both are
keenly listened to in circles near the White House. However, they seem to be say-
ing opposite things. Fukuyama (1993) has argued that Western democracy is the
only game in town worthy of the name, and that global politics nowadays simply
consists in attempts, by the less unfortunate nations, to achieve the same levels of
consumption and liberal rights as those enjoyed by Americans. In this context, he
also argues that the quest for recognition is fundamental and accounts for vari-
ous forms of identity politics. Huntington (1996), on the other hand, has argued
that current and future conflicts take place not between ideologies, but between
“civilisations”, that is related clusters of cultures, such as the West, Islam,
Hinduism and Eastern Christianity. Both Fukuyama and Huntington have been
severely criticised by academics and other intellectuals, and this is not the place to
repeat all the criticisms. On the contrary, I would argue that they are both partly
right. Fukuyama is right to assume that recognition by others is a notoriously
scarce resource in the contemporary world, but he is wrong in believing that
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recognition can only be achieved through the successful adoption of Western val-
ues and ways of life. Huntington is correct in saying that cultural differences are
important, but he is hopelessly off the mark when he tries to map out those dif-
ferences –his concept of civilisations is theoretically inconsistent and empirically
misleading– and there is also no reason to assume that such differences necessar-
ily lead to conflict. In fact, it has been shown that none of the armed conflicts of
the 1990s conformed with Huntington’s predictions2.
We must nonetheless concede that these conservative American
thinkers correctly claim that recognition and respect are important, and that cul-
tural differences matter. Where does this lead us?
It seems to lead us in the general direction of postcolonial theory.
According to writers such as Frantz Fanon, Ngugi wa Thiong’o and Edward Said,
the most difficult form of decolonisation consists in decolonising the mind; in
developing a self, and an identity, and a self-consciousness which is not based on
the categories of the colonisers. In giving the people of the world the choice of
being either with the US or with the terrorists (as he did in a speech delivered in
autumn 2001), Bush II refuses to acknowledge any position which is developed
out of other concerns than the US–“terrorists” axis. 
Human rights and the means of communication
In the context of the current crisis, this starting-point implies certain preliminary
conclusions: effective human rights activism requires at least a minimal knowl-
edge about local contexts and, particularly, about local conflicts. For poor coun-
tries to give wholehearted support to notions of the inalienable rights of the
individual, more is required than decisions to cut aid to countries which are not
yet committed to a free press and multi-party parliamentary democracy. What is
needed are social reforms which give people increased control over their own
existence –literacy programmes, land reforms, new job opportunities and so on.
As an implication, a global policy is needed where both big power (state,
geopolitics) and small power (family, community) are more equitably distributed.
This struggle, moreover, is as much about the means of communication as about
the means of production. As the late Algerian author Rachid Mimouni put it,
what ought to be required of the Europeans is “rather an attempt to understand
than material aid. What can democracy mean in a country like Ethiopia, where
dozens die of starvation every day?” (1992: 156). There are, in other words, seri-
ous problems which are not solved by a formulaic introduction of human rights,
and there are people who for perfectly understandable reasons see talk about
the freedom of expression as a diversion from the real issues. One may by all
means argue that Muslim men should give their wives the same rights and
opportunities as, say, Scandinavian women have (opinions are free), but it would
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be silly to assume that they think in the same way as we do. If one does so –pro-
moting human rights with the subtlety of a bulldozer– one implicitly says, as mis-
sionaries and foreign aid aristocrats have done for years, that the experiences of
others have no value, and that the others had better become like ourselves
before we bother to listen to them. One actually says that they do not exist until
they have become similar to ourselves. Respecting other life-worlds is, it must be
emphasised, not the same as ethical relativism, but on the contrary a recognition
of the need for a dialogue to go both ways, since the alternative is monologue
or worse: the sound from one hand clapping3.
The very conceptual pair “The West” and “Islam” is deeply problem-
atic. “The West” is a vague geographic term, including the EU, the USA and their
richest satellites (Canada, Norway, etc.), as well as two of the easternmost coun-
tries in the world, Australia and New Zealand. Islam is a universalistic religion with
adherents in every country, including all the Western ones. Could “The West and
the East” have been used instead, as a more consistent dichotomy, or perhaps
“Christianity and Islam” as in the old days? Hardly. All such dichotomies are
Trojan horses concealing the hidden agenda of overstating the importance of one
particular boundary at the expense of neglecting all the others. 
There is little to indicate that religion as such can be a source of con-
flict. A Christian fundamentalist has more in common with a Muslim fundamen-
talist, at the level of basic values, than each of them has with non-religious per-
sons. The forms of religiosity and the expressions of respect for al-Lah (or God,
as we say in English), are similar in both cases. Hundreds, possibly thousands, of
European Muslims have discovered this and have thus joined Christian
Democratic parties. Moreover, there are important ecumenical dialogues taking
place across “religious divides” in many places, including a major Islamic confer-
ence in Cairo in 1995, where central Muslim leaders condemned all forms of ter-
rorism on Islamic grounds, calling for extensive dialogue with the other
monotheistic religions originating in West Asia. At a more everyday level, it is
easy to see that folk religiosity on either side of the Mediterranean, for example,
has many similarities –saints, prayers, beliefs in the evil eye, and so on. Following
the attacks of 11 September, one should also keep in mind, all Muslim heads of
state except Saddam Hussain and the Taliban condemned the mass murder.
Already on the same evening, the Tehran Times stated that Islam forbids suicide
and that a murder of an innocent, according to the Koran, is tantamount to a
murder of all humanity. 
Malaysia’s then prime minister Mahathir offered to negotiate between
the USA and its adversaries in the autumn of 2001, and this might have been a
fruitful move: Malaysia is an overwhelmingly Muslim country, but it is also com-
mitted to Western notions of modernity. The USA did not take the offer up, and
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during a visit a month after the bombing had begun, I heard of no Malays who
defended the terrorist attacks, but a lot of them seemed to admire Osama.
Wrong address, no doubt, but the Castro effect no less.
If Malaysia’s “moderate Islam” had been granted its place in the sun,
fewer Malays would have looked up to Osama bin Laden, and more Westerners
would have discovered the similarities between the three great West Asian reli-
gions. Seen from a Hindu or East Asian point of view, the three religions appear
as virtually identical. Even from the inside, the parallels are striking. The Muslims
who have joined Christian Democratic parties in European countries have done so
because Christians and Muslims have shared interests in fighting phenomena
such as religious slackness, secularisation, birth control and divorces. During
another Cairo conference, in the autumn of 1994, the Catholic Church and
Muslim clerics joined forces to make a joint statement condemning abortion.
Moreover, many –anthropologists, journalists and others– relentlessly show the
absurdity of lumping together Indonesian rice farmers with Turkish merchants
under the umbrella of “Islam”; just as intellectuals in Muslim countries are per-
fectly well aware that “the West” contains something close to a billion individu-
als with a variety of values, societies and ways of life.
Polarisation
The current trend is that of growing polarisation. The relationship between the
West and Islam, as it has developed since the Gulf War, is beginning to resemble
the armaments race between the USA and the Soviet Union –a schismogenetic
process par excellence. In the end, both superpowers had enough nuclear
weapons to annihilate humanity many times over. These days, self-proclaimed
representatives of both Islam and the West compete –not over the number of
warheads, but over the souls of unattached individuals, in rhetorical attacks on
each other. In research on ethnic relations, this kind of mechanism is sometimes
called dichotomisation, that is the mutual defining of the other as the opposite
of oneself –as that which one does not want to be. Enemy images always
depend on this kind of simplistic, stereotypical depictions of the other. Realistic,
nuanced descriptions contain too many shades of grey and too much complexi-
ty to be of ideological use in creating hatred and implacability. Seen from the
north-west, Muslims, or “Islam”, may thus appear as undemocratic, sexist, illib-
eral, underdeveloped, brutal and culturally stagnated. The enemy image, inci-
dentally, is adjusted as its proponents change historically. While the generalised
Muslim woman today is depicted as an oppressed, intimidated and powerless
person, it was common in Victorian times to depict her as a profoundly erotic,
mystical and seductive character.
Seen from the south-east, the Europeans, or the people of the West,
may appear as cold individualists, as normless, immoral, arrogant, brutal, deca-
dent and insensitive. These dichotomisations owe little to objective differences
between Islam and Christianity, but to power relations feeding into assumptions
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about cultural differences. Roughly the same stereotypes that are now commonly
used about Muslims have been used variously to describe South Europeans, North
Norwegians, blacks and “Hindoos” in the past. They are responses to a need in
the population where the stereotypes are formed rather than expressions of char-
acteristics in the stereotyped population. 
Muslim stereotypes of “the West” would themselves have been wor-
thy of a book-length treatment4; suffice it here to say that they are no less simplis-
tic and no less antithetical to openness and dialogue than the Western images of
Islam and Muslims. For a recent example, it has been shown how the Pakistani
press, in the months following the attacks, contributed to strengthening mutual
stereotyping through portraying the “clash of civilizations” perspective as the
only Western view of the matter (Ali, 2002). 
Beyond cultural stereotypes is the language of undiluted bigotry and
chauvinism, as in certain forms of war reporting. During the Gulf War, the
Western press wrote of the US-led forces as “lionhearts, professional, heroes,
daring, loyal, resolute, brave”, while Iraqi soldiers were described as “brain-
washed, paper tigers, cowardlike, desperate, the bastards from Baghdad, mad
dogs, unscrupulous, fanatical”5. More recently, Bush II spoke of the suicide pilots
of 11 September notoriously as “cowards”. As Susan Sontag pointed out shortly
afterwards6, many strong words may be used to describe these madmen (such as,
for example, brainwashed or psychotic), but cowards they were definitely not.
Similarly, it is difficult to say that the US pilots, who dropped their cluster bombs
on Afghanistan from a comfortable height before returning for breakfast, were
exceptionally courageous.
Important things are at stake. If the perverse idea of a civilizational
conflict between the West and Islam catches on, which it may well do notwith-
standing the insistence to the contrary by Western leaders, the result is likely to
be escalating violence on both sides. In Gregory Bateson’s system theory, this kind
of self-reinforcing process is known as schismogenesis7. Bateson, a versatile and
original thinker, applied the concept of schismogenesis to as diverse phenomena
as alcoholism, gang violence and arms races. Convinced that the cause of schis-
mogenesis was an error in the dominant Western mode of thought –the error of
individualism– Bateson wrote that if, for example, boasting is an element in the
relationship between group A and group B, then “it is likely, if boasting is a
response to boasting, that each group will drive the other to an exaggerated
emphasis on this pattern, a process which –if it is not checked– only can lead to
more and more extreme rivalry and, in the final instance, to enmity and break-
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down in the entire system” (Bateson, 1972:68). In his model of schismogenesis,
moreover, the only way the self-reinforcing circuits could be changed would be
through the interference of a third agent (or network node) leading to a new
framing of the issue. Translated into poststructuralist language, the discursive
hegemony putting “the West” against “Islam” in a deadly embrace can only be
broken through the intrusion of one or several counterdiscourses framing the
world in different terms. These counterdiscourses have been abundantly available
both before and after 11 September. However, politicians and a majority of influ-
ential media commentators seem to accept that the conflict has something to do
with the West and Islam, even if they usually concede that Islam is complex and
that most Muslims are naturally peaceful. In the Muslim part of the world, where
the media are less liberal and the political leadership by and large less attuned to
the population, the situation has been different. While the political leaders have
supported the US against the Taliban/Al-Qaeda, the media have generally not
offered a very nuanced picture of the West, portraying the “clash of civilizations”
view as representative of “Westerners” (Ali, 2002). In spite of important cracks in
the mutual enemy images, therefore, there are clear indications that they have
been strengthened after 11 September. The anti-immigrant new right in the poli-
tics of several European countries experienced a healthy growth after the attacks,
and in countries like the Netherlands and Denmark they currently have consider-
able political power. Public debates about minorities in several European countries
have been redefined from a dominant focus on discrimination and labour market
issues to a less charitable focus on enforced marriages, sexual mutilation and
hijabs. Condolezza Rice is on record as having explained to a concerned citizen
that the reason “they” hate “us” so much is that “we elect our leaders” and that
“you and I [meaning women] are allowed to work”. In Muslim countries, Gilles
Kepel quotes religious leaders who worry that the attacks have led to a deep set-
back in the ongoing, and in many ways progressing intellectual dialogue between
Muslims and Westerners (Kepel, 2002).
There are some exceptions. A few influential commentators and politi-
cians saw the terrorist attacks and the retaliation of the USA in the same light. In
an address to the summit of the Organisation of Islamic Countries in February
2002, Malaysia’s prime minister Mahathir defined a terrorist as “someone who
attacks civilians”, thereby seeing the suicide pilots and the US Air Force over
Afghanistan as the same kind of actors. 
Single horrors such as the deliberate bombing of the Mazar-i-Sharaf
prison and the accidental killing of more than forty Afghanis on their way to a
wedding in 2002, or new routine forms of punishment witnessed in the provi-
sional, but already long-standing Guantanamo prison where inmates are neither
considered criminals nor prisoners of war and therefore deprived of all their
rights, would have raised an international storm of protest had the perpretator
been any other country than the post-11 September USA. The complacent and
indifferent reactions from the White House, even after the violent transgressions
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in the Abu-Ghraib prison in Iraq (2004) can only be understood as an indication
that the regime in the USA sees it as necessary to bracket democratic rights, at
least temporarily. The recent withdrawal of the USA from various forms of inter-
national cooperation, including international courts of justice and environmental
treaties, suggests that global dialogue may have to proceed without the partici-
pation of the USA in the near future. 
The postcolonial perspective and global identity politics
Arguments involving respect of others and recognition of cultural differences
tend to lead to accusations of cultural and moral relativism. Let us therefore
consider these objections. On the one hand, practically every intellectual and
politician in the rich countries supports a set of universal values ratified by the
United Nations (particularly the Universal Charter of 1948); that all individuals
should have the same rights and liberties. On the other hand, nobody can deny
that these rights and liberties are unevenly distributed in the world, that many
are denied rights deemed essential in the West; and moreover, that people who
live in different social environments inevitably experience and interpret the
world in different ways.
Many historians and social scientists have in recent years shown how
both past and present change according to shifting circumstances8. The history of
India will not be the same if it is written in New Delhi as if it is written in London:
both versions may be true, but historical truth is always partial. Similarly, both
women and ethnic minorities have in recent decades demanded that their ver-
sions of past and present should be granted their rightful place in education and
public spheres, so that e.g. metropolitan French children learn about slavery just
as Guadeloupean children learn about the Gauls, or that American children learn
about the brutality of the European invasion of North America just as they learn
about George Washington and the cherry tree. 
It is difficult to contest the assumption that such a relativisation of the
past makes it possible to tell historical narratives with improved accuracy. It has nev-
ertheless also been said that this kind of relativism, perhaps particularly in the field
of literature, can also degenerate into “political correctness” and downright
nihilism, where the classic values of truth, beauty and virtue are not produced
through a shared process of evaluation, but through political decisions based on
ideas of equity between groups. Conservative thinkers like Alain Finkielkraut (1987)
and Fukuyama’s mentor Allan Bloom (1987) warned against these tendencies in the
1980s and both defended universal (or, it might be objected, hegemonic) criteria
for aesthetic and moral norms. Not surprisingly, both were accused of acting as
spokesmen for a kind of white man’s burden which by default would consider all
non-European cultural expressions as inferior, since the standards were set by the
likes of Plato and Shakespeare. There is no easy response to this objection. 
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Already in the 16th century, Michel de Montaigne ventured to suggest
that cannibalism might be no less rational than customs taken for granted by his
French countrymen. A century later, another famous Frenchman, Blaise Pascal,
wrote that truth is another on the other side of the Pyrenees. Both accepted the
relativity of truth and value as a fact which could not easily be overcome. In the
18th century, the founder of the early Romantic Sturm und Drang movement in
Germany, Johann Gottlieb von Herder, wrote somewhat more systematically on
cultural differences. He insisted, against the Enlightenment philosophers, on each
people’s right to its distinct cultural and linguistic identity. The so-called universal-
ism of the likes of Voltaire he discarded as a form of provincialism: Voltaire might
believe that he sought to disseminate a universal form of civilization, but what he
was really engaged in was –to use a more recent term– French cultural imperial-
ism. The role of France in 18th century Europe may in some respects be compared
to the role of the USA in the contemporary world. French language, manners and
fashions were à la mode from St. Petersburg to Boston, and it was not surprising
that the strongest anti-French reactions came from their closest neighbours and
oldest enemies, the Germans. The parallel with the contemporary situation con-
fronting the USA with Muslims is tempting to draw.
Respect and fascination for the customs of other peoples has in prac-
tice been easy (and completely free of charge) so long as they were far away.
Tensions develop more easily in the contemporary world. Thanks to accelerated
globalisation and migration, we now live in a truly global society where everyone
is in the same boat in terms of ecology, military power, economics and politics.
We have all been brought closer to each other in this stage of modernity, and the
problem of relativism has moved from the confines of literary speculation and
academic research to the forefront of politics. Although globalisation clearly
reduces cultural differences –the monetary economy, mass media, human rights
thinking and state interventions are everywhere, to mention a few examples– it
has increased the attention given to cultural differences many times over. Partly
this is simply a result of increased contact: it is through contact with others that
one becomes aware of oneself, and the presence of others may seem a threat to
one’s own culture and customs. Partly the intensified interest in cultural difference
is a product of nostalgia and alienation: identity politics tends to glorify a mythi-
cal past when “our way of life” was still intact and undisturbed by the disruptive
forces of global modernity; it draws much of its emotional energy from a sense of
loss caused by change. It could thus be said, as a general principle, that the more
similar people become, the more different they try to be. 
In this kind of situation, cultural rights become a coveted resource and
a feature of political life that needs to be taken seriously. American Indians are no
longer far away in their reservations, and they cannot simply be assimilated into
the melting-pot of US modernity: they demand both territory, compensation,
quotas in the educational system and influence over reading lists. Muslims are no
longer colonised peoples under European military control, but highly articulate
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and audible voices in the global public sphere –whether they are based in
Bradford or in Peshawar– and they demand respect and equity. After 11
September, the violence is no longer even mainly unilateral. As Osama bin Laden
said in his famous al-Jazeera interview, he wishes to make it clear that Americans
can no longer sleep safely in their beds. 
Dangerous cultural relativism?
Minority rights issues and political Islam cannot simply be lumped together;
there are important differences. But they have one thing in common, as do all
identity politics, namely the demand for a more democratic, more just global
regime of communication. Although the methods of fundamentalists like
Osama bin Laden are frightening, their demands are perfectly comprehensible
and even, to many, reasonable. It would be ridiculous to claim, as certain
extreme relativists do, that alien perspectives on the world are impossible to
fathom. To anyone but autists, psychopaths and brainwashed fanatics, it is per-
fectly possible to understand, for example, ecological, religious, neoliberal or
ethnic fundamentalism, but such an understanding requires that one makes an
effort to put oneself in the other’s place. Doing this does not necessarily mean
that you “lose yourself”. As Clifford Geertz (1983) puts it: “You don’t have to
be one to know one”. Making an effort to understand the local experiences
and cultural judgements that underpin practices such as female circumcision,
arranged marriages, Premier League football or sati (widow-burning) is not the
same as lending support to them. If one is to understand a text, one has to be
aware of one’s own pre-understanding and one’s own prejudices to give it jus-
tice. This also applies to meetings between people with different values, experi-
ences and horizons. 
If understanding across boundaries and translation between cultural
worlds is possible, then, it may also perhaps be argued that it is possible to estab-
lish shared standards of beauty, truth and virtue. This is probably true, but it will
not happen through authoritarian imposition of values from a hegemonic power;
only through equitable dialogue and mutual empathy. In such an ideal situation
of communication (which the world has not seen), it cannot be taken for granted
that Beethoven will be judged superior to Indian ragas. This position, which posits
the essential unity of humanity, differs from the multiculturalist position, which
takes as its premiss that cultures are bounded, and assumes that the best one can
hope for is coexistence side by side. 
An important distinction has to be made between cultural relativism
as method (in order to understand) and as world-view (in order to act and make
judgements). The first variety is the only alternative to crude and authoritarian
dismissals of alternative views, while the second variety is a recipe for confusion
and nihilism. Cultural relativist method is a necessity (everything has to be under-
stood within its proper context), while cultural relativist morals are a tragedy.
Understanding is not the same as defending.
Media and Glocal Change
38 |
In a truly dialogic democracy, participants would have to demonstrate
knowledge of others before moving on to critical or condescending statements
about them. Having established the necessary knowledge, each individual would
be free to choose his or her side, for one does not necessarily become a Nazi by
reading and understanding Mein Kampf. It would, in other words, not be accept-
able to oppose Islam without knowing what Islam is. If this simple principle had
been established in public debate and politics, it would have improved the quali-
ty of many interventions considerably.
If, instead of dialogic democracy, one chooses ignorance since under-
standing the other ostensibly leads to dangerous relativism, there are only three
alternatives: violence, silence or the language of power.
Dialogue is more urgently needed today than in earlier periods, when
non-white, non-Christian peoples were forcibly muted and Europeans largely
dealt with them as servants, negative cultural stereotypes and research objects.
“The others” have in every way homed in on us. Thanks to the globalisation of
information flows, a statement made in Tehran may in a matter of few moments
lead to a heightened temperature in Trinidad; and a sudden catastrophe in
Manhattan may immediately put the entire world on an edge.
Advice to the new hegemons
Allow me to end this chapter with some personal reflections of a general charac-
ter, which have nothing to do with Islam as such, but which concern the role of
“the West”, and particularly the USA, in global society. Europeans and North
Americans of predominantly European origin have now dominated the world for
more than five hundred years. It may perhaps be about time that this long hege-
mony comes to an end, whether it happens indirectly through migration, violent-
ly through self-destructive entrenchment against a foe which is generated from
within (terrorism), or simply through shifts in the dynamic of the global economy9.
One may only hope, if this happens in the century that has just begun, that the
new hegemons will continue to absorb, renew and develop the genuine contribu-
tions of European and North American society to global civilization, such as the
respect (at least in principle) for human life and integrity, impartial bureaucracy
and, especially, the capacity for doubt and ambivalence which has been a trade-
mark quality of European culture (if not of European power politics) since the
Renaissance. It may also be hoped that the new hegemons are able to learn the
right lessons from the mistakes of Europe and the West: the fanatical technolog-
ical optimism, the lack of community and solidarity, the class divisions and indif-
ference, the fundamentalist arrogance in relation to others, the stressful way of
life under careerist regimes of work, growing street crime, racism and discrimina-
tion, the lack of consideration for the environment... Looking back on the last
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9 It is time and again argued that the economic powerhouse of the world moved from the Atlantic to the
Pacific basin decades ago, but that most Europeans still have not caught up with this.
centuries –let us say the period that began with Columbus’ landing on 12
October 1492 and the subsequent expulsion of Muslims and Jews from Spain a
few weeks later– the chances are good that the networked, decentralised world
which may now be emerging, can turn out to be more humane than five hundred
years of European hegemony have been. It will not happen with the help of
Osama bin Laden and Taliban-like networks, but it won’t happen with the help of
American bomber planes either. One has to be blind and deaf in order to believe
that this is the “best of all possible worlds”, a world where every person has the
same values and where opportunities are equally distributed. The currencies of
the global society are dollars and bombs, and this society speaks business English
with an American accent. Nobody ought to be surprised if some of those who are
overwhelmed, or overrun, by this power react like greenhouse plants are sup-
posed to react to heavy metal: by rolling up into small, hard balls.
No matter where power and dominance may be concentrated –now
and in twenty years– this period, when the world is probably about to be re-
moulded, is a good period for a renewal of world-views. The old, dominant
world-view presented a hierarchical world composed of peoples, civilizations and
nations that were clearly delineated in relation to each other, geographically and
culturally speaking; they had their own history, their own values and their own
customs, as it were. Europe and the West, according to this view, represented
reason and progress, even if others had also contributed bits and pieces. This
image is now about to be replaced by a world characterised by exile, flows, inten-
sified contacts, creolisation, hybridisation and all forms of mixing; where no
boundaries are absolute notwithstanding attempts to build ever taller walls; but
where people continue to have different experiences because they live under
varying circumstances. Territorial power is faltering and is being challenged every-
where –Microsoft to al-Qaeda– by the more flexible power of networks. If the
demands for justice, respect and recognition from Muslims and others are not
now met by another response than condescending arrogance, this world will
almost certainly catch fire. In the old world, injustice and rage could be “con-
tained”. Not so in the network world.
This is a world of impurities, grey zones, uncertainties and ambigui-
ties, where the belief in progress is being replaced by ambivalence, where self-
confidence is being replaced by anxiety, where trust is threatened by suspicion,
and where the ability to listen has become a more important faculty than ever
before in history.
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